I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium is devoted to patent law reform, and every time I think about reform I am reminded of the famous quip, "don't talk to me of reform, things are bad enough as they are." 1 Given that contingencies are plentiful, I proceed with these words in mind and write this article with the modest goal of getting the reader to question whether the federal courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, should be more receptive to empirical and social science scholarship when deciding patent cases. 2 My principal point is that patent law is not without context. Our patent laws operate as part of an interdependent mix of incentives and regulations that bestow benefits and impose costs on society and individuals alike. And the patent system is relied upon to varying degrees and for different reasons by divergent industries. 3 The Federal Circuit's opinions embody sophisticated reasoning and thoughtfulness, and the judges certainly understand the contextual nature of patent law (and other areas of the law for that matter). But given the special status of the Federal Circuit and its expansive judicial power, 4 I wonder whether this understanding is adequately reflected in its opinions; 5 or expressed in a sufficiently candid manner. 6 Indeed,
2.
The same can be asked of Congress, but that inquiry is for another time.
3.
See WESLEY M. COHEN, RICHARD R. NELSON & JOHN P. WALSH, PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (finding that firms in certain industries patent to block the development of substitutes by a rival while firms in other industries are more likely to use patents to force rivals into negotiations).
4. For example, on the issue of claim construction, see Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 , 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998 ) (reaffirming that claim construction is a "purely legal question" reviewed "de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction"). On the issue of Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) obviousness determinations, see In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 , 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998 ) ("This court reviews the ultimate determination of obviousness as a question of law."). The underlying factual considerations of an obviousness determination are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053 , 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2001 ) (noting that the PTO's "factual determinations underlying its rulings on anticipation and obviousness are reviewed under the substantial evidence test" (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999))).
5. That is, adequately reflected from an empirical or social science perspective. 6.
The candor issue pertains to the court's technologic particularization. Specifically, as I discuss in Part IV, infra, scholars have pointed out that the court has, in recent years, begun to treat technologies differently under its common law and Title 35 of the United States Code. My point is that although particularization may be desirable, the an appellate court that limits the power of those institutions positioned closer to the ground should utilize a vehicle that allows the court to compensate for its institutional disadvantages vis-à-vis district courts 7 and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 8 In other words, a window on the world is needed.
Over the past fifteen years, but particularly in the last five, there has been a significant amount of empirical and social science scholarship in the area of patent law. 9 Much of the court has neither discussed its rationale for particularization, nor cited any empirical or social science research to justify such.
7.
See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 663 (1971) (writing that it is not that the trial court judge "knows more than his loftier brothers; rather, he sees more and senses more"). Professor Rosenberg goes on to write:
In the dialogue between the appellate judges and the trial judge, the former often seem to be saying: "You were there. We do not think we would have done what you did, but we were not present and we may be unaware of significant matters, for the record does not adequately convey to us all that went on at the trial. Therefore, we defer to you.
Id.
8. See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1499-1507 (1995) (describing institutional and constitutional advantages of PTO in determining patentability).
For a discussion on the relative advantages and disadvantages between courts and agencies regarding the allocation of interpretive authority, see 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 90-91 (3d ed. 1994) .
9. Indeed, at least two Federal Circuit judges have publicly recognized an increase in empirical and social science scholarly output. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2000) , vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("There is burgeoning modern scholarship directed to studies of invention, investment, and patent systems, generally building on the work of William D. Nordhaus."); see also Hon. Paul Michel, speech delivered at Patent Law Reform Conference on March 1, 2002 in Berkeley, California (recognizing recent trend in empirical and economic patent law scholarship).
This trend toward the empirical and social science could arguably be considered a counter-trend when viewed in the context of legal scholarship generally. Several commentators have bemoaned the excessive production of multidisciplinary and hightheory legal scholarship. As Richard Posner wrote, "[s]ome crazy stuff is being published in law reviews nowadays." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 101 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW]. See also Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) ("I would like to see the legal professoriat redirect its research and teaching efforts toward fuller participation in the enterprise of social science, and by doing this make social science a better aid to judges' understanding of the social problems that get thrust at them in the form of constitutional issues."); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992) ("[I] t is my impression that judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy."). It would appear that Judges Posner and Edwards would agree with Professor David Shapiro when he writes, "scholarly criticism is not undertaken simply for the delectation of other scholars; it is designed to improve the world that is the subject of its concern." David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731 (1987 The nature of this empirical and economic scholarship, which has led to a better understanding of our patent system, can be characterized as pragmatic in its approach to, and explication of, the issues that it addresses. I refer to this literature as pragmatic because it fits nicely with the school of thought known as "legal pragmatism." 17 Although the phrase legal pragmatism is polysemous, most legal pragmatists endorse certain fundamental concepts such as empiricism, contextualism, and instrumentalism, 18 and it is these themes, to a large extent, that the aforementioned scholarship embraces. This pragmatic scholarship looks behind the curtain of theory with the goal of revealing a world that either dismantles or reaffirms our assumptions about the efficacy of patent law.
Producing first-rate pragmatic scholarship is no easy task; it takes time, sometimes plenty of money, and is risky in that a scholar's empirical data may undercut his pre-empirical normative assumptions or simply reaffirm what is already known. 19 But it is trying for another reasonthat is, in any area order to protect the profits of the initial innovator); Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995) 2031, 2040 n.32 (1996) (stating that "[l]egal pragmatism is multifaceted" but possesses certain "core themes"); see also POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 10, at 19 ("Pragmatists want the law to be more empirical, more realistic, more attuned to the real needs of real people."); Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 9, 15 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) ("We pragmatists keep in the back of our minds the reminder that we are thinking to some endthinking instrumentally. We also keep there a reminder that we are thinking against a background of tacit presupposition of which we can never be fully awarethinking contextually.").
19.
See Heise, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 10, at 111 ("Unfortunately, data gathering is frequently labor-intensive and time-consuming and, consequently, often quite expensive"); Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing A Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 364 n.76 (1995) (noting the concern of scholars that empirical results will potentially undercut of the law, a degree of complacency among policy makers and legislators has a tendency to "set in" regarding accepted theories (or theories that are espoused by special interests). In patent law, for example, it has historically been accepted that the prospect of an increasingly strong proprietary right in the form of a patent will lead to an increase in innovative activity. 20 We now know that is not true; 21 but the point is that it is difficult, and lonely at times, to question entrenched wisdom. 22 Once produced, however, the reward can be great. Pragmatic scholarship can establish parameters to circumscribe decisionmaking and also act as an escort through complex terrain. 23 But, as shown in Part II of this article, despite its restraining force or illuminative power, this literature, with a few notable exceptions, 24 has largely been absent from the patent normative thesis); Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792, 827 (1991) ("While all this social science can appear to be a daunting prospect to academics whose training consisted of reading appellate decisions, law professors, in theory, are able to perform social science studies."); Schuck, supra note 10, at 331 ("Until one gathers and analyzes the data, one cannot know whether one will make important new findings or 'merely' confirm what everybody (especially in retrospect) 'already knows.' In contrast, the articles that we typically write exhibit a kind of predestination; once we have thought our ideas through, we know where we are headed. Few surprises await us, and perhaps we prefer it that way.").
20.
See COHEN et al., supra note 4, at 2. 21.
Mansfield, Patents and Innovation, supra note 12, at 180 ("Despite the fact that the patent system generally is defended at least partly on the grounds that it increases the rate of innovation, the present study indicates that its effects in this regard are very small in most of the industries we studied . . . . However, in a few industries, particularly pharmaceuticals and chemicals, the effects of the patent system were reported to be very substantial.").
22.
As Lawrence Lessig has written, "[I]n these times, the hardest task for social or political activists is to find a way to get people to wonder again about what we all believe is true. The challenge is to sow doubt." LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 5 (2001) .
23. Consciousness, Creative Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91, 129 (1998) ("Holmesian legal pragmatism enables one to view the Constitution as setting the parameters for the popular sovereign of "We the People" to engage in socio-cultural experimentation through the political process.").
See generally Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical
24. For example, Judge Newman, over the past several years, has cited and discussed much of this work in her opinions. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson, 62 F.3d 1512 , 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1995 ) (en banc), reversed, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman explicated:
Our decision, like every decision of patent principle, affects the national interest in technologic innovation. I have sought to understand how that effect is manifested in the doctrine of equivalents. In so doing I have taken an analytic path not discussed by the court, albeit a path that I believe underlies the common law of equivalency. This path has led me into the thicket of the sociology and economics of patent law, for I have attempted to place the basic question-the role and application of the doctrine of equivalents-into the practical context of the purposes and workings of the patent system, as informed by modern scholarship. REV. 659, 667-70 (1998) (explaining judges' and practitioners' criticisms of "impractical scholarship," which is defined, in part, as using social science tools to advocate for legal reform). It should be pointed out, however, that secondary sources are not entirely absent from Federal Circuit opinions. As we will see in Part II, infra, the court frequently cites treaties and practitioner-oriented journals.
26. Interestingly, Judge Newman has called for her colleagues to exercise greater awareness of consequences. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1064 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("It is self-evident that the placement of an increasing number of pitfalls in the path of patentees serves only as a deterrent to innovation. Before taking so deliberate a step, the court should at least consider the consequences."). In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabuskiki Co., she propounded: This spontaneous judicial action represents a venture into industrial policy whose consequences have been inadequately considered. The majority's announced purpose of facilitating competition by restricting patentees' access to the doctrine of equivalents has not been evaluated for its effect on the nation's technology-based industry, for its effect on the system of patents as an innovation incentive, or indeed for its effect on competition. REV. 4, 8, 56 (1998) (calling on the Court to pay "greater attention to the likely consequences of its decisions and to the empirical assumptions underlying its doctrines" and suggesting that the Court "rely to a greater extent on empirical and policy analysis in its written opinions"); Monahan & Walker, supra note 26, at 488 (asserting "that courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule of law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts").
I suggest, however, in Part III of this article, that the judges should evidence this awareness by cautiously being more receptive to pragmatic scholarship in their published opinions. I say "cautiously" because I do not want to overstate the salutary effects of pragmatic scholarship as a common law tool; indeed, there are dangers and limitations associated with an appellate court embracing empirical/economic literature. 27 But on balance, a more pronounced obeisance toward "facts on the ground" makes sense from an adjudicative perspective.
Moreover, it is consistent with the intellectual origins of American intellectual property law. Contrary to European intellectual property law, which is grounded principally in Kantian and Hegelian notions of personality, inalienability, and self-expression, 28 American intellectual property law has traditionally been justified in terms of consequentialism. 29 By urging judges to cautiously exercise more empiricism, this article calls for a return to American patent law's intellectual roots.
In Part IV of this article, I discuss a secondary, but important, concern that pertains to judicial candor. As some scholars have argued, the court has, in recent years, begun to particularize technology. 30 That is, the court has treated For purposes of economy, I limit the present study to how often the court merely cites secondary sources, including materials in addition to empirical and social science data. I defer the important questions of why the court cited a secondary source and the influence of secondary sources, including empirical and social science scholarship, on Federal Circuit patent jurisprudence. 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The framers, employing colonial syntax as one would expect, were respectively referring to works of authors and inventors when they used the terms "Science" and "useful Arts." In the 18th century, the term "Science," from the Latin, scire, "to know," meant learning or knowledge in general and had no particular connection to the physical or biological sciences like it does today. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51-52 (1949) (examining the origin of the word "science"). Thus, the operational relationships are between "authors," "science," and "writings" for copyright on the one hand and "inventors," "useful Arts," and "discoveries" for patents on the other. 36 and indeed, throughout the history of American intellectual property law, the importance of patent law to innovation has "scarcely" been questioned and has largely been taken for granted. 37 While few would doubt that there is a relationship between patent law and innovation practices, the nature of this relationship has not been thoroughly understood, mostly because during this time scholars, with some exceptions, did not question the underlying assumptions of our patent system. 38 However, as noted earlier, in recent years, scholars have begun to take a closer look at our own patent system. 39 Let us take a look at the extent to which the Federal Circuit has cited this scholarship.
A. How Often Does the Federal Circuit Cite Scholarship in its Patent Law Opinions?
I reviewed every published Federal Circuit opinion from 1983 through 2000 to discern how often the court cites scholarship or a secondary source in its patent and non-patent opinions. 40 (I use the terms "scholarship" and "secondary source" interchangeably.) 41 The data are reflected in Tables 1A, 1B, Cf. BUGBEE, supra note 36, at 11 (illustrating the significance of patent law).
38.
See, e.g., Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong, 2d Sess., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, 15, 20 (Comm. Print 1958) (Author Fritz Machlup) ("While the early opinions on the patent system were expressed merely in occasional comments and remarks contained in general treatises on political economy, economists during the great patent controversy of the second half of the 19th century wrote articles, pamphlets, and books on the economics of exclusive rights. The arguments for and against the patent system have not changed much since that time.") 39.
Refer to notes 10-17 supra. 40 The opinions were produced via a Westlaw search. West. 1954) , which was cited in thirty-five opinions. The law review citations were widely dispersed among law reviews, with no single law review or law review article getting much play.
C. IP Scholarship at the Second and Ninth Circuits
By way of comparison, I looked at the trademark and copyright jurisprudence of the Second and Ninth Circuits. During the years 1996-2002, these courts of appeals, in their copyright and trademark opinions, have cited to scholarship considerably more often than the Federal Circuit has in its patent law opinions. But, like the Federal Circuit, the Second and Ninth Circuits are more 50.
Twelve of the seventeen bar journal cites are from one case, In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994 Tables  4A-C:   TABLE 4A Although each circuit cites treatises more often than law review articles, 55 the empirical data reveal that the Second and Ninth Circuits cite scholarship roughly four times as often as the Federal Circuit. What are the reasons for this disparity? One reason may be that the Federal Circuit is more familiar and comfortable with patent law than the Ninth and Second Circuits are with trademark and copyright law, and, therefore, Federal Circuit judges may feel a diminished need to consult the secondary literature. (The Federal Circuit decides considerably more patent cases than the Second and Ninth Circuits decide trademark and copyright casesabout eleven patent cases to one copyright or trademark case during 1996-2000.) Another way of putting it is that the Second and Ninth Circuits' docket is more diverse than the Federal Circuit's, a situation that may lead to greater reliance on secondary authority. Also, perhaps the judges on the Second and Ninth courts of appeals are drawn more from the academy than Federal Circuit judges and, therefore, come from a culture that is more receptive to academic scholarship; or maybe there is more trademark and copyright scholarship from which to choose.
III. THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF ADJUDICATIVE EMPIRICISM

A. A Case for Cautious Obeisance
The common law can be slow to respond to changing conditions, but the Federal Circuit's common law relating to patents evolves relatively quickly, rendering it unique in this regard. 56 This rapid pace, due largely to the court's exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in patent law, 57 has both positive and negative effects. One negative effect is that a brisk common law can give the impression that the court's jurisprudence is chaotic 55.
As Table 4C indicates, the treatise-law review citation ratio for each circuit is as follows: CAFC (appeals from district courts or overreaching. 58 A positive effect, which is more germane for present purposes, allows the court to address evolving technologic conditions and associated legal issues more readily. Nonetheless, there is only so much the common law's episodic approach can accomplish in a technologic context. The common law remains a blunt instrument when analyzing transient technologies, and the court's institutional position limits its ability to determine what issues come before it and when. Thus, the window of resolution is oftentimes small, forcing the court to take advantage of its opportunities to resolve doctrinal and policy-related conflicts when it has the opportunity. With this in mind, empirical and economic scholarship can be viewed as giving the players in the patent game more "bang for their buck," allowing the court, during these precious adjudicative moments, to focus more clearly on the issues at hand. As such, pragmatic scholarship acts as a steel that can sharpen common law analysis, leading to a more precise resolution of issues that are likely to reflect conditions on the ground more accurately than can be obtained with traditional forms of common law analysis. Indeed, economic and empirical scholarship can be influential. 59 Although I do not want to overstate the benefits or authoritative weight of this type of scholarship, its influence is grounded in the recognition that it can serve as a yardstick with which to compare competing policy concerns. 60 In this regard, empirical and economic scholarship not only serves as a compass, but can also establish juridical boundaries for the court's 58.
For example, Judge William Young recently noted: Almost since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been dogged with criticism for straying from the path carefully delineated for appellate tribunals. Disappointed litigants and commentators alike have criticized the court for factfinding and other forms of hyperactive judging. Increasingly, the bar is expressing concern over the court's decision-making procedures and its apparent willingness to take over the roles of patent examiner, advocate and trier of fact. Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123-24 (D. Mass. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
59. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 26, at 228-29 (discussing the influence of law and economics scholarship on the development of antitrust law and policy); Monahan & Walker, supra note 26, at 477 ("Once heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of general agreement among jurists.").
But 
2002]
PATENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE 119 decisionmaking. 61 Interpreting the patent code and the common law are normative endeavors, but the court verges on the abstract by failing to give adequate weight to empirical and economic scholarship. The more the court's pronouncements diverge from facts on the ground, as reflected in the pragmatic scholarship, the more the court's legitimacy will be called into question. 62 Of course, judges judge and, because of this discretion, it would be a mistake to infer that an authoring judge (or panel) ignored "relevant" scholarship or was not aware of such simply because this scholarship was not cited in the resulting opinion. It may well be that the judge was unpersuaded by what the scholarship evinced or believed that more traditional forms of analysis (e.g., precedent) were sufficient to support his position. But I would argue that as a general matter, a judge should err on the side of citation or, more dramatically, offer a discussion of the cited scholarship. At the very least, one can argue that an opinion that cites (and discusses) empirical and economic scholarship has a signaling effect; it tells the relevant community that the court is aware of its surrounds and understands that its decisions have particular consequences. 63 It would also contribute to the REV. 739, 742 (1991) (discussing Justice Brennan's use of "scientific information as a judicial check on the actions of government"). In a previous work, I argued that the science and the norms of a scientific community should serve as checks on patent law adjudication and legislation. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000) .
An example of a judge recognizing the guiding force and constraining power of pragmatic scholarship can be found in Justice Blackmun's concurring remarks in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) . There, the Court narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule based on vague empirical evidence. Justice Blackmun cautioned that the Court's "empirical judgment . . . is a provisional one." Id. at 928. Therefore, Justice Blackmun continued:
[i]f it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct demands no less.
Id.
62. For a discussion of judicial legitimacy, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 , 1390 -411 (1991 
B. The Limitations of Using Scholarship in Decisionmaking
I do not wish to leave you with the impression that there are only benefits to be derived from the court's increased reliance on, citation to, and discussion of, empirical and economic scholarship. In the first paragraph of this article, I invoked Burke's cautionary words and wrote that contingencies are plentiful. What I mean is that there are profound concerns about the Federal Circuit's use of empirical and social science scholarship that apply to any appellate court. I discuss two such concerns.
Mode of Delivery.
Given the appellate courts' institutional position, the first concern relates to the most suitable vehicle for delivery of empirical and social science scholarship. 64 Some have argued that the parties before the court should present the latter with empirical or social science research in their respective briefs. 65 But just as judges judge, fully what can be recondite literature.
64. Appellate courts simply do not have the institutional capability to obtain empirical information. See Posner, supra note 10, at 12 ("The capability of the courts to conduct scientific or social scientific research is extremely limited, and perhaps nil."); Dorf, supra note 27, at 51 (noting that the Supreme Court's "institutional posture and adjudicatory methods constrain its ability to learn about the world in which its doctrines operate"). With respect to the Federal Circuit specifically, see Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 837 (1999) REV. 197, 235 (2000) ("Lawyers should take an active role in using non-legal materials as authority in appellate briefs, and law schools should take a more active role in educating prospective lawyers about effectively use [sic] non-legal authority."); Monahan & Walker, supra note 26, at 495-97 (discussing the benefits of presenting scientific research in the form of written briefs); see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 , 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1995 ) (Newman, J., concurring) ("The parties and the amici curiae did not discuss this public interest aspect, although the consequences of our decision, as for all law, extend beyond those of the parties involved in the specific dispute."); Judge Michel Presses for More Data and Rigor in Patent Reform Process, 63 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 429, 430 (Mar. 22, 2002) (paraphrasing a speech delivered by Judge Paul Michel of the Federal Circuit at the University of California at Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of Law as follows:
[W]hen the court is asked to reconsider established patent law understandings, [Judge Michel] added, it must rely on the briefs, and those filings rarely contain any "data, facts, or hard numbers" to substantiate the policy arguments being advocated by the litigants. Id.
advocates advocate. Thus the court must exercise caution in its reliance on scholarship cited by appellant and appellee. While that could be said about almost anything the parties submit to the court, there is a certain disarming veneer of objectivity (or credibility) that accompanies pragmatic scholarship. Although amicus briefs can provide empirical data or social science research to the court in a seemingly more objective fashion, amici writers are not without agendas and may distort information to serve their goals. 66 Perhaps judges can dispatch their respective clerks to conduct rigorous searches in the social science databases-clearly clerks are capable of such (although perhaps not as much as an expert staff member of Congress)-but in the end having clerks spend hours researching the social science literature on innovation policy is probably ill-advised given that there are other pressing tasks for which a Federal Circuit clerk is responsible.
Sifting the Wheat from the Chaff:
The Question of Evaluating Scholarship. Closely related to the delivery issue is the evaluative issue.
Although the pragmatic patent law scholarship that I cited earlier in this article is first rate, 67 some scholarship is mediocre or sub-par. 68 In other words, the court needs tools to evaluate and distinguish legitimate scholarship from so-called "junk science," including issues related to methodology. 69 70. An interesting proposal has been put forth by Professors Monahan and Walker. Based on their proposal that social science scholarship should have the weight of authority of law, they argue that courts should evaluate social science research in an analogous manner in which legal precedent is evaluated. They write:
[T]he principles courts use to distinguish cases in terms of their precedential worth bear a striking similarity to the principles used by social scientists to distinguish research studies in terms of their scientific worth. We propose, therefore, that courts evaluate scientific research studies along four dimensions analogous to the four dimensions used to evaluate case precedent. Courts should place confidence in a piece of scientific research to the extent that the research (1) has survived the critical review of the scientific community; (2) has employed valid research methods; (3) is generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) scholarship, which in turn may imply that the court is not in tune with the technologic communities that its decisions affect.
A related concern that exacerbates this problem is that there is rarely a monolithic or universal viewpoint in the realm of patent law and innovation policy. Indeed, sometimes there are simply no answers. 72 As Richard Brunell writes, "if the vast economics literature on intellectual property conveys one message, it is that the relationship between intellectual property protection and economic welfare is unclear." 73 But that is not to suggest there are no answers.
Each pragmatic work, by contributing a piece to the IP puzzle, is a Rosetta stone adding resolution at the feature level. And, to the extent answers remain unclear, we should continue, as the economist Fritz believes that its lack of candor helps maintain the perception of continuity, an important judicial value; or the court may be skeptical about the potential onslaught of interest group activity that usually accompanies industry-specific rules and regulations. There may also be the important practical concern of getting the votes to form a majority; as Susan Estrich notes, "[c]andor doesn't necessarily win votes." 81 Whatever the cause, as a matter of judicial legitimacy, there is nothing wrong with treating different technologies differently under the patent law. In fact, Congress's tweaking of the patent code in recent years has long since dispelled the notion of technologic neutrality. 82 Technology advances, sometimes very quickly, 83 and the law is a dynamic social instrument that must adjust to changing circumstances. But when candor is lacking, legitimacy is called into question and cynicism is engendered. 84 Judges, who have "neither force nor will, but merely judgment," 85 must present the basis and rationale for their decisions. The reason (or one reason) is obviousexplication imposes constraints on the judiciary because it allows outsiders to debate the merits and persuasiveness of these unelected officials' work product. And, as David Shapiro writes, "[i]n the absence of an obligation of candor, this constraint would be greatly diluted." 86 With respect to particularization, candor would better enable members of the bar, commentators, and policymakers to debate openly whether treating software and biotechnology differently makes sense given what we know about the innovation game within these industries. Of course, inferences can be drawn and 81.
Estrich, supra note 82, at 1228.
82.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000) (providing a more lenient nonobviousness standard for biotechnology processes); 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000) (proscribing the enforcement of medical procedure patents); 35 U.S.C. § § 155, 156 (2000) 86. Shapiro, supra note 10, at 737; see also Estrich, supra note 82, at 1228 ("If the cases are in conflict, acknowledge it, and be clear about the principle that guides you in one direction or another. It is precisely because of its underlying political nature that the task of judging, of interpreting the Constitution in particular, demands both rigor and candor."); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 723, 740-41 (1979) (discussing the importance of honesty in judicial opinions). discussions can occur based on guarded judicial opinions, but surely the debate (and the law) would benefit from greater candor. 87 
V. CONCLUSION
There is much to be said for pragmatic scholarship. Both illuminative and constraining, consideration of empirical work and social science scholarship can lead to decisionmaking that is more reflective of facts on the ground. But no matter how valuable this work is to our understanding of the patent system, we should be cognizant of its limitations. In other words, cautious obeisance is the order of the day.
87.
See generally Idleman, supra note 82 (examining rationale to support conventional wisdom that candor is both a virtue and a requirement of judges and proposing a methodology for determining when judicial order is appropriate).
